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To explain differences in output per worker across countries, we test for the workings of 
a learning-by-doing hypothesis and the hypothesis that the effectiveness of human 
capital depends on the laws and institutions that promote workplace practices that allow 
skills to develop. The quality of laws and institutions in the workplace is measured by 
an index of economic security (ESI). We find that ESI is a good proxy for human 
capital whilst educational attainment is not. We also find that countries with high ESI 
use more effectively the skills of the workforce and are better at exploiting profitable 
opportunities in capital markets. 
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| 1 | INTRODUCTION 
 
 version of the neoclassical production function expresses output per worker as 
the product of effective human capital and the capital-output ratio, the latter 
raised to a power measured by the ratio of income from capital to income from 
labor. If externalities are assumed away, differences in capital-output ratios can be 
shown to contribute to a factor of 2 in explaining cross-country differences in output 
per worker. Moreover, if one assigns—as a rule of thumb—a 10 percent return to 
schooling, one finds that cross-country differences in schooling can account for a factor 
of a little more than 2 in explaining cross-country differences in output per worker. This 
suggests that if schooling were the only variable to determine human capital, the 
“effectiveness” of human capital would have to account for a factor of about 8 in 
explaining the 32-fold difference in output per worker between the richest and the 
poorest economies. This prompted Prescott (1998) to write: “Needed: A Theory of 
Total Factor Productivity.” In this paper we explore the determinants of the 
effectiveness of human capital and the way in which effective human capital and 
physical capital interact to account for the observed differences in living standards.  
  
Like Lucas (1988), we believe that there is an externality attached to human capital. 
However, whilst Lucas’ external effect derives from a measure of the average level of 
accumulated human capital, the externality associated with human capital in our model 
derives from a measure of the social infrastructure specific to the labor market. That 
social infrastructure plays a crucial role in determining cross-country differences in labor 
productivity is well documented in Hall and Jones (1999). However, the authors’ 
measure of social infrastructure seems too broad for our purposes. What is needed, in 
our view, is a measure of institutions and policies that encourage and promote the 
accumulation of skills at the work place or out of the work place. We believe that the 
economic security index (henceforth, ‘ESI’) compiled by the International Labor 
Organization (henceforth, ‘ILO’) can serve to proxy the external effects of human 
capital.1  
    
In summary, there are two key hypotheses put forth in this paper. Firstly, differences in 
capital-output ratios play a far more important role in explaining cross-country 
differences in standards of living than neoclassical models of growth would account for 
since the latter neglect the effects of learning-by-doing. Secondly, the effectiveness of 
human capital crucially depends on the laws and institutions that protect skills and 
promote workplace practices that enable skills to develop. What both hypotheses share 
in common is some degree of externality.     
    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II revisits the neoclassical 
                                                 
1 In their very thorough and important study, Black and Lynch (2001) employ cross-section as well as 
panel data estimation methods to test the importance of a number of workplace practices and information 
technology on the productivity of a large sample of U.S. businesses. They find, among other things, that 
unionized establishments that have practices that promote joint decision making and  incentive based 
compensation have higher productivity than unionized businesses with more traditional management 
relations. Whilst there is some similarity in terms of aims and methodology between Black and Lynch 
(2001) and our study, the differences are significant. Firstly, our main aim is to explain the sources of 
cross-country differences in productivity and this calls for a significant amount of aggregation. Secondly, 
we wish to investigate the role of spillovers in physical and human capital accumulation on productivity at 
the national level. The finding that once we control for economic security educational, attainment 
becomes statistically insignificant, suggests that—to some extent—the productivity recorded at the firm 
or industry level derives from an external effect. 
A 
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model to rehearse, in some detail, its behavior and its ability to fit the data. In Section 
III we outline a learning-by-doing model to explain away the major challenges posed by 
the neoclassical model. In section IV we present one representative specification of the 
model we propose to estimate. Section V presents the specifications of the model we 
explore empirically cast in a cross-sectional and panel data setting, and describes the 
variables and the methods of estimation employed. The empirical findings are discussed 
in section VI and conclusions are drawn in section VII.   
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| 2 | THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL 
 
 typical production function in the neoclassical model assumes that output 
exhibits constant returns to scale in physical capital and in effective human 
capital so that:   
 
 
ααα )/)(()()( 1 iiiiiiiii HAKHAKHAY == −                (1)  
 
where Y measures output, A measures the effectiveness of human capital, H measures 
the stock of human capital, K measures the stock of physical capital, α is a parameter 
that measures the share of income attributed to physical capital, and i is used to 
subscript variables pertaining to the ith country in a world economy comprising N such 
countries. 
 
It is convenient to define H as the product of the human capital embodied in the 
representative worker h and the number of workers currently employed L:  
iii LhH ≡                             (2) 
 
Combining (1) with (2) we arrive at the expression for output per worker, y, given in (3) 
below:  
 
αα )/)(()/)(( iiiiiiiiiii hAkhAHAKhAy ==        (3)   
 
where:  ( )iii LKk /≡  
 
In what follows, it will prove convenient to express the ratio of physical to human 
capital in terms of the ratio of physical capital to income. For this purpose, notice that 
(1), above, implies (4) below:     
 
( ) ( ) 1// −= αiiiii HAKKY          (4) 
  
From (4) and (3) we arrive at an expression for y given in (5) below: 
 
1/)/)(( −= ααiiiii KYhAy          (5) 
  
Using r to subscript variables belonging to a rich economy and p to subscript variables 
belonging to a poor economy we can use (6a)-(6c), below, to account for cross-country 
differences in y:  
 





                                           (6b) 
 




To assess the importance of human capital in explaining cross-country differences in per 
capita incomes, it is convenient to follow Jones (2001) and assume that, 
 
ieSchreh =            (7) 
 
where er measures the average return to schooling and where iSch  measures the number 
of years of schooling for those over 25. Using the Barro and Lee (2001) data on 
educational attainment, Jones (2001) reports that workers in the richest economies 
have, on average, 11 years of schooling while workers in the poorest economies have, on 
average, 3 years of schooling. The author then applies an average return to schooling of 
10 percent to establish that differences in human capital account for a factor of  
 
2.28.0)311(1.0 ≈=− ee . 
 
To assess the importance of capital-to-output ratios in explaining differences in living 
standards, a frequently used practice is to use data on the gross investment to income 
ratio and argue that ( )YK /  is proportional to ( )YI /  along the balanced growth path. 
To illustrate, consider the balanced growth path identity that links ( )YI / , ( )KI /  
and ( )YK / :  
 
δ++=≡ xnKYYIKI iii )/()/()/(        (8a) 
 
where n measures the rate of population growth taken to be exogenous, x measures the 
growth rate of output per person along the balanced growth path, and δ measures the 





)/()/(                    (8b) 
 
If we assume away cross-country differences in δ++ nx , we need only use data for the 
share of gross investment to GDP to compare capital-output ratios internationally. 
According to Jones (2001) and Hall and Jones (1999), the wealthiest economies have 
investment shares up to 5 times the investment shares found in the poorest of 
economies. Setting α = 1/3, the authors conclude that differences in capital-output 
ratios (or in investment shares) account for a factor between 1.8 and 2.2 in explaining 
cross-country differences in income. To account for a more than 32-fold difference in 
output per worker between the richest and the poorest economies, it must be the case 
that differences in A account for a factor between 7 and 8. The major challenge, 
therefore, is to explain A.   
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| 3 | EXPLAINING AWAY THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE 
NEOCLASSICAL MODEL 
 
robably the earliest line of inquiry into issues of endogenous growth goes by the 
name of learning-by-doing associated with Kenneth Arrow (1962). In this 
section, we consider a version of a model of learning-by-doing to better explain 
the vast differences in output per worker observed across countries. To anticipate our 
empirical findings, suffice to say that features of the model we consider are shown to be 
supported by the data.  
 
 
A Model of Learning-by-Doing: Modeling Effective Human Capital 
To introduce learning-by-doing, we hypothesize that effective human capital depends 
on the product of two factors specific to each country: technological know-how iT , and 
social infrastructure iIs)( , so that, 
 
iiii TIsHA )(=             (9) 
 
Suppose, further, that iIs)( is exogenous and time-invariant, and that iT  is a by-product 
of accumulating physical and human capital determined by a function which exhibits 





−= 1  ,   01 ≥≤ γ                   (10) 
 
Combining (9) with (10) to substitute AH out of equation (1) and dividing by L, we 
arrive at,   
 
ϕα )/)(()( 1 iiiii hkhIsy
−=                   (11) 
where )1( αγϕ −+= a  
 
Equation (11) encompasses two interesting polar cases: (a) When 1=γ  we obtain a 
version of the AK model of endogenous growth where the growth rate of output per 
worker is driven by the saving rate; (b) When 0=γ , we revert to the model of equation 
(1) where the growth rate of output per worker is exogenously determined. What is of 
interest in both cases is that A is seen to be synonymous with social infrastructure.  
 
To narrow the concept of social infrastructure relevant to our analysis, observe that 
equation (9) hypothesizes a link between social infrastructure and human capital. To 
highlight further this link, we re-write equation (11) as follows: 
 
φφαφα −−− == 1/11 )/)(()()/)(()( iiiiiiiii YKhIshkhIsy                (12) 
 
Since our notion of social infrastructure is linked with the effectiveness of human capital 
and human capital is linked with skills, it is natural to want to link α−1)(Is  to an index 
constructed to take the value between 0 and 1, call it E, and designed to measure the 
P 
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degree that labor market institutions protect and promote workers’ skills. To this effect 
we can write,  
 
φφφφα −−− == 1/1/1 )/)(()/)(()( iiiiiiiii YKhEYKhIsy                (13) 
 
At the moment we leave aside the important issue of how to measure E until section V. 
Assuming that such a measure exists, it would seem natural to model effective human 
capital in a way that allows E to interact with schooling. To this effect, consider a 
specification that proved successful empirically:  
 
)(ln)( ii SchEi eEh
β=                    (14) 
 
In (14) above, the return to schooling is measured by ii SchE /β , a term that allows 
for heterogeneity amongst countries’ returns and captures the aspect of diminishing 
returns to schooling reported in the literature.  
 
 
A Model of Learning-by-Doing: Modeling the Capital-Output Ratio in 
the Long Run 
It would be tempting to assume that differences in capital output ratios or in investment 
shares reflect differences in saving rates and assume saving rates to be exogenously 
determined to close the model. This, however, would ignore the role of the relative price 
of capital, q, in determining the capital-output ratio, an omission likely to lead to 
erroneous conclusions. To illustrate, consider revisiting equation (8b) to multiply both 
sides with the (relative) price of capital to obtain: 
 
))(/()/( δ++= xnYqKYqI                  (15a) 
 
Consider, next, the long-run relation between the interest rate, r, the marginal product 
of capital, MPK and the price of capital, q, to write: 
 
)()/()/( δ+== rqMPKqKaY                                                                             (15b) 
                                                                                                                               
Letting ρ denote the rate of time preference and θx denote the product of the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion with the growth rate of consumption per capita, the equilibrium 
interest rate is defined by: 
 
xr θρ +=                                            (15c) 
 
Combining (15a) with (15c), and rearranging, we obtain:  
 
]/[])[())/()(())(/( xaxnrxnxnYqK θδρδδαδδ ++++=+++=++           (15d) 
 
One can instantly identify the middle and the right hand-side of (15d) with the 
equilibrium saving rate. Thus, by (15d) and (15a) we come to identify the long-run 
equilibrium saving rate, s, with the ratio of gross investment (valued in units of output) to 
GDP. This is what equation (15e) below records:  
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sYqI =)/(                               (15e) 
                                                                                                                                             
One important conclusion is that unless one can safely ignore cross-country differences 
in q one cannot use data on )/( YI  to impute the value for the saving rate. For though 
it is true that )/( YI  is much higher for the richer economies, it is also true that q is 
much higher for the poorer economies. This suggests that there is little—if any—cross-
country variation in the ‘true’ measure of the saving rate. To explain that rich 
economies are endowed with a capital-output ratio which is higher by a factor of almost 
5 than that of poorer economies, we may assume—as a working hypothesis—that 
perfect capital mobility rules in the long-run such that )/( qMPK equalizes across 
countries in the long-run. This suggests that the economies with high (low) capital-




| 4 | THE MODEL THAT EMBODIES OUR KEY HYPOTHESES 
 
hen we come to estimate our model, we explore several distinct 
specifications. At the moment, though, it would suffice to describe a simple 
specification to capture the key elements of the main hypotheses advanced in 
this paper. To this effect, we combine (15b) with (13) above to arrive at:  
 
)1/(1/ ))(()/)(( φφφφ −−− == iiiiiiii qhEbYKhEy                (16) 
where: ( )[ ] ϕϕδϕ −+≡ 1/)/(rb  
 
Using equation (14) to substitute out iEh)( , we obtain:  
 
( )ϕϕβ −−= 1/)(ln( )(qbey ii SchEi                              (17) 
 
Taking logarithms and ignoring the constant term, we write:  
 
( ) qSchEy iii ln1/)(lnln ϕϕβ −−=                          (18)2 
 
If we are to be successful empirically, we ought to arrive at an estimator of β  which, 
given the data, yields a sensible return to schooling, a return which can be corroborated 
by other sources. Similarly, our estimator for ϕ  must be considerably bigger than 1/3 if 















                                                 
2 In an earlier study, Jones (1994) documents a negative relationship between the relative price of 
machinery and economic growth. He argues that there is a negative relation between investment and the 
relative price of capital on the one hand, and a positive relation between investment and the growth rate 
on the other, and that this explains the negative association between the relative price of machinery and 
the growth rate. He attributes variations in the relative price of capital to distortions (through taxes, tariffs 
and/or subsidies). In our paper, we favor an approach that focuses on the long-run relation between the 
relative price of capital and the average product of labor. Whilst we also believe that there are distortions 
in the relative price of capital, we prefer to build our analysis on the existence of installation costs in 
capital formation and use this to derive a relation between the relative price of capital and the capital-




| 5 | ESTIMATING OUR MODEL 
 
n the empirical section we will be reporting results obtained by applying cross-section 





The cross-section, dynamic, regressions to be estimated are given in equations (CS1) to 
(CS3) below: 
 





































and where the )( iε  terms are the structural errors.   
 
To implement these regressions, we averaged each variable listed in (CS1) to (CS3) over 
the N cross-sectional units and then expressed each equation in terms of deviations from 
cross-sectional averages. This was done for the purpose of minimizing cross-sectional 
dependence. A convenient way to estimate these equations is to apply a Bewley (1979) 
type transformation. The advantage of this transformation is that it readily yields 
estimates of the long-run average coefficients and of the mean lag, together with the 
standard errors attached to these estimates. To effect this transformation we multiply 
each of the right-hand side terms of (CS1)-(CS3) by )1/1( ρ−  and we replace 1,−iy  
by iyτΔ , where Tyyy iiTi /)( 0−=Δτ . Since iyτΔ is correlated with the error term, we 




The panel data regressions to be estimated are given in equations (PD1)-(PD3) below: 
 ( ) itititiittiit cSchEqyy εγββρ +++×++= − lnlnlnln 211,           (PD1)  ( ) ( ) itititiititiit cSchEqEyy εγββρ +++×+×+= − lnlnlnln 211,          (PD2)  ( ) itititititiit cSchqEyy εγββρ ++++×+= − lnlnlnln 211,           (PD3) 
 
where tγ  is a year-specific intercept designed to control for year-specific shocks that 
affect all cross-sectional units at t, where ic  is an unobserved, time-invariant,  and 





Definitions, Measurement, and Data Sources 
 
Quality of Social Infrastructure in the Labor Market 
Our proxy for the quality of social infrastructure is the Economic Security Index (ESI) 
developed by the ILO (2004).  Its authors make the general point that, “... each time 
the risk environment is increased, the modal citizen has to devote proportionately more 
of his or her time to risk control activity and proportionately less to developmental or 
freedom enhancing activity”. They then focus on the labor market to describe and 
quantify activities that reduce risk or, rather, enhance security in that market. They 
distinguish between the following seven types of security: (1) Labor Market Security; (2) 
Employment Security; (3) Job Security; (4) Work Security; (5) Skill Reproduction 
Security; (6) Income Security; and (7) Representation Security. An index is developed 
for each of the seven types of security and for as large a group of countries as data 
permits. Finally, the authors construct a weighted average of the seven constituent 
indexes which they label ESI. In what follows, we assume that the index thus far 
called iE  is simply the ESI for the i
th country. 
 
Educational Attainment, Output per Worker and the Price of Capital 
Our measure for schooling is taken from Barro and Lee (2001). In 
particular, iSch)( measures the average number of years of schooling attained by the 
representative agent in country i who is over 25 years of age.  Our measure for the 
output per worker and the price of capital are based on data published in the Penn 
World Tables Version 6.1 (PWT6.1). In particular our measure for q is the 
ratio )/( PPI , where PI  is the PPP value of the price index for investment goods and 
P  is the PPP value of the price index for output.  
 
Our Sample 
It was decided at the outset to include only those economies in PWT6.1 which, under 
the period of investigation, possessed a full set of data with quality not below C and 
were managed on market principles. The sample of countries in PWT6.1 that met these 
criteria was 83. Of these, only 68 economies possessed a full data set on educational 
attainment and only 60 possessed data on the ESI. This narrowed the size of countries 
for the purpose of our analysis to 49. These are the countries which meet the criteria of 
(a) operating a market economy under the period of investigation, (b) possessing a full 
data set on output per worker, and the relative price of capital of quality not below C, 
and (c) possessing data on the ESI and a full data set on educational attainment. 
However, and for the reasons we explain in the next section, our empirical results are 
based on a group of 35 countries. 
 
Our sample spans the period 1960-2000. Data on output per worker and the relative 
price of capital are measured annually, schooling years are measured quinquennially, 
and the ESI is based on a single observation taken on 1999 or the year closest to 1999. 
To employ panel data methods of estimation, we express output per worker and the 
relative price of capital as 5-year averages starting with 1960-1964 and ending with 
1995-2000 (altogether 8 observations) and we also utilize 8 observations on schooling 
starting with the 1960 observation and ending with the 1995 observation.  
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Some Issues of Estimation 
 
Estimating Panel Data Regressions with Integrated Variables  
To employ panel data methods of estimation where the size of the time dimension of 
the panel, T, is small relative to the size of the cross-section dimension, N, it is 
customary to apply methods of estimation appropriate to dealing with stationary data 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 175).  This is because, it is argued, with small T but large N the 
appropriate procedure is to conduct an asymptotic analysis on the basis that T remains 
fixed as ∞→N .  When T is large relative to N or when both T and N are large, 
asymptotic analysis can be conducted on the basis that T can grow to infinity or that 
both T and N grow to infinity, as the case may be. In those circumstances, it may seem 
natural to pretest the data for unit roots to avoid the problems one usually associates 
with spurious regressions. 
 
However, problems can arise even if the panel consists of co-integrating relationships 
for, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue, pooled estimators are inconsistent when 
parameters differ randomly across groups. In the case where the independent variables 
are I(1) but form a single co-integrating vector with the dependent variable and 
coefficients differ randomly, “the pooled regression will not constitute a co-integrating 
regression and the parameter estimates will not be consistent” (Pesaran and Smith, 
1995, p. 91). Hall et al. (1999) show that there is an important case—albeit rather 
special case—where the findings of Pesaran and Smith do not apply. This is the case 
where the regressors in each co-integrating unit are driven by common stochastic trends. 
Phillips and Moon (1999) go even further to argue that one can consistently estimate 
the average long-run coefficient in a panel of spurious regressions where no co-
integrating vectors are to be found between the I(1) regressors and the I(1) regressand. 
This departure from the Pesaran and Smith findings is based on a definition of the long-
run average coefficients which, in the case of Phillips and Moon, can exist even in the 
absence of co-integration.3    
 
Estimating Cross-Section Regressions with Integrated Variables 
Even if coefficients are allowed to vary randomly across units and variables are I(1), 
consistent estimates of the long-run average coefficients can still be obtained in a setting 
of cross-section regressions (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). What is required is that in each 
such regression there is a single co-integrating vector linking the regressors with the 
regressand and that the regressors are strictly exogenous.   
 
Panel Data and Cross-Section Regressions with Integrated Variables: Pretesting for Unit 
Roots 
With a sample size of N=49 and a time dimension T=8, we may have been justified to 
ignore the time series properties of the data. However, since the hypotheses advanced in 
this paper are meant to apply to countries which exhibit conditional convergence, we 
felt that if our panels were to contain integrated series, these series must co-integrate. To 
test for unit roots, we first applied a variety of panel unit root tests to the PWT6.1 series 
to arrive at inconclusive results. However, Augmented Dickey Fuller tests applied to 
each country’s series individually were conclusive; not surprisingly, in almost all the 
series tested, we could not reject the unit root hypothesis. Panel unit root tests applied 
                                                 
3 For a review of recent developments in panel data models with integrated variables and dynamic panel 
data models with and without integrated variables, see Phillips and Moon (2000), Baltagi and Kao (2000) 
and Banerjee (1999).  
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to the Barro and Lee (2001) educational attainment data were nearly unanimous in 
rejecting the unit root hypothesis. To avoid having unbalanced regressions, we applied 
the Johansen test for co-integration to the series for output per worker and the relative 
price of capital to arrive at a set of 35 countries for which, by at least one criterion, we 
rejected the null of no co-integration at the 95% level of confidence. The empirical 







































                                                 
4 We do not report here the results of our stationarity and co-integration tests for reasons of space, but 
they are available from the authors upon request. Our sample contains the following 35 countries: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Finland, France, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mauritius, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Tunisia, USA, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. 
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| 6 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Estimates from Cross-Section Regressions 
able 1 below presents Two Stage Least Squares estimates of (CS1) to (CS3) 
outlined above. We describe the manner in which we obtain in-sample 
predictions estimates in the Appendix. 
 
Table 1. Cross-sectional regressions (Sample: 35 countries). Regressand: iy  
 
CS1 CS2 CS3 
Regressors:   Regressors:   Regressors:   
iyτΔ  -5.2810 iyτΔ  -5.7010 iyτΔ  -6.6467 
 [1.2882]  [1.4960]  [2.0221] 
iq   
-1.2004 
ii qESI ×  -2.4990 iq  -1.0221 





ii SchESI ×  0.8630 
 [0.1835]  [0.2066]  [0.3263] 
iESIln  1.0476 iESIln  1.2132   
 [0.2407]  [0.2581]   
0.5949  0.5780  0.4838 
0.9701  0.8641  0.9086 
Shea partial R-squared 
for each instrument  
0.9472  0.9311  0.9377 











  221.66 
  5253.62 
p-value for the null 
hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid  
0.7939 
 
 0.4229  0.2041 
Observations 35  35  35 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. The instruments for equations (CS1) and (CS2) are: 
lagged iq , lagged, iSch , lagged ( )ii SchESI ×  and 0iy .  The instruments for equation (CS3) are 
lagged iq , lagged ( )ii SchESI ×  and 0iy .  In all specifications, the estimated constant is zero due to 
our data being demeaned.  The lagged variables are averages over the entire time period other than the 




Our choice of instruments is intuitive: First, we use lagged values of the endogenous 
regressors as instruments. Second, we use initial income ( 0iy ) as an instrument for the 
change in income ( iyτΔ ) and we expect this to be a highly relevant instrument based on 
the convergence hypothesis from the growth literature.  To evaluate the appropriateness 
of our instruments, we report the Shea partial R-squared (Shea, 1996) and the F-
statistic corresponding to a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
irrelevant. These two statistics are obtained after the first-stage regressions and address 
the issue of instrument relevance. In all cases, we find that the null hypothesis of 
instrument irrelevance is rejected. The Shea partial R-squared statistics are no lower 
than 40 percent, while the F-statistic is (with one exception) in excess of the rule-of-
thumb value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). We also report the p-value of a test of the 
T 
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null hypothesis of instrument validity. Again, for all three cross-sectional regressions, we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous.5  
 
Glancing at Table 1, one cannot fail to observe that once one controls for ESI, 
schooling years no longer play an independent role in explaining output per worker: 
economic security is seen to be a good proxy for human capital whilst educational 
attainment is not. This suggests that to measure the effect of educational attainment 
statistically, it would be necessary to let schooling years interact with economic security. 
It may also suggest that decisions about how much schooling to acquire are based on—
among other factors—the social infrastructure in the market for labor summarized by 
economic security. 
    
In (CS2), the elasticity of output with respect to the relative price of capital is equal 
to ( )ESI5.2 , which, for a given return to capital, it is also the elasticity of output with 
respect to the capital output ratio. Countries with a highly developed social 
infrastructure in their market for labor are seen to be more responsive to changes it the 
profitability of capital compared to countries with a less developed infrastructure. As it 
turns out the average value for iESI  for the richest five countries in the sample is 0.757 
whilst the average value for the poorest five countries is 0.216.  This means that the 
elasticity of output with respect to the capital—output ratio is 892.1)757.05.2( =×  for 
the rich countries and 54.0)216.05.2( =×  for the poor countries. This, in turn, 
implies that the elasticity of output with respect to capital is about 65.0892.2/892.1 ≅  
for the rich countries and about 35.054.1/54.0 ≅  for the poor countries. Thus the 
model implies that rich countries are able to benefit from learning-by-doing whilst poor 
countries seem unable to benefit. Notice, also, that the size of the absolute value of 1β  
in (CS1) and (CS3) is not far from the average of 1.892 and 0.54, as it should be.6 
Notice, next, that the three estimates for the mean lag imply an average value for the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable equal to about 0.85. Given that the data are 
constructed to be 5-year averages, economies seem to adjust to their balanced growth 
path, at the rate of, around, 3 percent per annum. 
 
In (CS3), the elasticity of output with respect to schooling is ( )ESI863.0 , whilst the 
                                                 
5  We recognize there may be issues of endogeneity in the economic security index (caused by feedback 
from the dependent variable).  We do not address this issue in the cross-sectional regressions, but we relax 
the assumption of exogeneity of the ESI (and in particular, of interaction terms involving the ESI) in our 
panel specifications (See Section VI.B). As we shall see, cross-sectional and panel coefficient estimates are 
consistent with each other, which suggest that endogeneity is not a cause of serious concern in cross-
sectional specifications. 
6 In a model with installation costs but with a constant savings rate, the formula for the speed of 






nxbnx where b is the installation cost parameter. Our data on 
q suggest that an appropriate value for b for the poor countries in our sample is about 20 whilst for the 
rich countries of about 0.5 may be sufficient. Noting that our cross-section estimates suggest that  = 0.65 
for the rich countries and that  = 0.35 for the poor countries, and following Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1999) to set δ++ nx = 0.08, we find that β  = 0.0275 for the rich and β  = 0.036 for the poor 
which suggests an arithmetic (unweighted) yearly average speed of a little over 3.175 percent. This is only 
marginally above the upper bound for the speed of convergence considered by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1999). 
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. Utilizing sample averages for the 
period under observation, we find that the five richest countries in the sample have an 
average return to schooling equal to about 6.93 percent whilst the poorest five countries 
have an average return equal to about 9.46 percent.  
 
Finally, the richest five economies in the sample of 35 are, on average, about 10.8 times 
wealthier than the poorest five economies. The estimates presented in Table 1 can 
account for about a 7-fold of this difference leaving a residual factor of about 1.5.  
Overall, the estimates in Table 1 accord well with the estimates that would be 
compatible with a world where some countries can reap the benefits from learning-by-
doing and where the social infrastructure that prevails in the market for labor plays a 
critical role in explaining labor’s productivity.       
 
Empirical Results From Panel Data Regressions 
Tables 2 presents estimates of (PD1)-(PD3) obtained using the system GMM estimator 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). The long-run estimates with associated standard errors 
(labeled LPD1 to LPD3) are presented in Table 3.  For each specification, we report the 
Chi-squared statistic for a Wald test of overall significance of the model, as well as the  
p-value for the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. We also report the p-values 
of the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation applied to the first difference equation 
residuals. If our estimation strategy is appropriate, we expect not to reject the null 
hypothesis of a first order autoregressive model but to reject that of second order 
autocorrelation in the first difference equation residuals. We would then conclude that 
 
 
Table 2. System GMM panel regressions (Sample: 35 countries). Regressand: ityln  
 
PD1 PD2 PD3 
Regressors:  Regressors:  Regressors:  
1,ln −tiy  0.8755  1,ln −tiy  0.8573 1,ln −tiy  0.9229 
 [0.0518]  [0.0794]  [0.0504] 
itqln  -0.1492  ( )iti qESI ln×  -0.2129 ( )iti qESI ln×  -0.2456 
 [0.0854]  [0.1558]  [0.1995] ( )iti SchESI ln×  0.1455 ( )iti SchESI ln×  0.1880 itSchln  0.0579 
 [0.0703]  [0.1259]  [0.0350] 
      
Constant 1.1411 Constant 1.2529 Constant 0.7717 
 [0.4404]  [0.6218]  [0.4454] 
      
Wald Chi-squared  3183.81  3453.17  6333.00 
p-value Arellano-
Bond tests of AR(1) 
















Observations 245  245  245 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications include time-dummies, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. All three regressors are treated as endogenous in 
specifications (PD1)-(PD3). 
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lagged values of the endogenous variables are valid instruments. Given the reported p-
values in the table below, it is clear that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments used by the GMM estimator—as a group—are exogenous. This finding is 
strengthened by the Arellano-Bond test results. We therefore have evidence to conclude 
that the estimation procedure is appropriate and proceed to employ the coefficient 
estimates to compute the long-run coefficients and their standard errors. 
 
 
Table 3. Long-run estimates (Sample: 35 countries).   
 
LPD1 LPD2 LPD3 
itqln  -1.198 ( )iti qESI ln×  -1.492 ( )iti qESI ln×  -3.185 
 [0.52]  [0.751]  [1.347] ( )iti SchESI ln×  1.169 ( )iti SchESI ln×  1.317 itSchln  0.751 
 [0.32]  [0.292]  [0.207] 
Constant 9.165 Constant 8.780 Constant 10.009 
 
 
A first key hypothesis put forth in this paper is that differences in capital-output ratios 
play a far more important role in explaining cross-country differences in standards of 
living than neoclassical models of growth would account for because these models 
neglect the effects of learning-by-doing. The second key hypothesis advanced in this 
paper is that the effectiveness of skills crucially depends on the laws and institutions that 
protect skills and promote practices that allow skills to develop in the workplace. As we 
shall argue immediately below, the long-run solutions to (PD1)-(PD3) strongly support 
both these hypotheses.  
 
To begin with, let us recall that the numerical value of the elasticity of output per 
worker with respect to the price of capital is also the numerical value of the elasticity of 
output per worker with respect to the capital-output ratio. If we were to follow Hall and 
Jones (1999) and take capital-output ratios in rich countries to be five times the capital-
output ratios in poor countries then the recorded elasticity of 1.198 in (LPD1) would 
imply that differences in capital-output ratios contribute a factor of about 6.8-fold in 
explaining the more than 32-fold difference in standards of living. Differences in 
effective skills between rich and poor captured by the term ( )iti SchESI ln169.1 ×  give 
rise to a factor of 5.9-fold in explaining cross-country differences in living standards if, 
like Hall and Jones (1999), we let rich countries have 11 years of schooling compared to 
3 years for the poor countries and if we let the economic security index for the rich 
stands at 0.7 and for the poor at 0.2. Therefore, (LPD1) is more than capable to explain 
the vast difference in living standards between the rich and the poor without the need to 
resort to unobserved differences in multi-factor productivities.  
 
The model’s parameters accord well with theory in general and the hypotheses put forth 
in this paper in particular. For instance, an elasticity of output per worker with respect 
to the price of capital equal to 1.198 suggests that the elasticity of output with respect to 
capital is (1.198/2.198) = 0.55, a number which would accord well with some 
mechanism of learning-by-doing at play. Using sample averages for the five richest and 
the five poorest countries in the sample the model implies that the (marginal) return to 
a year of schooling to an agent who has 9.471 years of schooling and enjoys an 
economic security index of 0.757 is 10.74 percent whilst the marginal return to an 
agent who has 2.274 years of schooling and enjoys an economic security index of 0.216 
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is 23.86 percent.7 Whilst these figures suggest sharply diminishing returns to schooling, 
these returns are well in line with results reported in Bils and Klenow (2000). The 
model “predicts” that the richest five countries in the sample are about 12.83 times 
richer than the poorest five compared with an observed difference of 10.8.                             
 
In (PD2) we test the hypothesis that all other things equal countries with high (low) 
economic security index are better (worse) placed to respond to variations in the 
profitability of capital. The long run solution to (PD2) supports this hypothesis. The 
implication of (LPD2) is that the richest five countries in the sample have an elasticity 
of output with respect to capital equal to 0.57 compared with an elasticity of 0.41 for 
the poorest five. Regarding returns to schooling the model implies that the richest five 
countries in the sample enjoy, on average, a 12.01 percent return whilst the poorest five 
enjoy, on average, a 26.89 percent return. The model “predicts” that the richest five 
countries in the sample are 13-fold richer than the poorest five. 
 
In (PD3) we continue to assume that, other things equal, countries with a high (low) 
economic security index are better (worse) placed to respond to variations in the 
profitability of capital. However, and rather counter-intuitively, we do not allow for a 
direct interaction between economic security and skills. As a result, the contrast between 
(LPD3) on the one hand, and (LPD1)-(LPD2) on the other is quite noticeable: (LPD3) 
calls for a more pronounced difference between returns to education in the rich and the 
poor countries and it also calls for very strong  learning-by-doing effects, especially for 
the rich. What is at play in (LPD1)-(LPD2), but not in (LPD3), is the direct interaction 
of economic security with skills. Therefore what the contrast between (LPD3) with 
(LPD1)-(LPD2) seems to suggest is that the effect of the interaction between economic 
security and skills is to reduce the gap in returns between rich and poor. Finally, it 
would come as no surprise to say that (LPD3) fits the data less well than (LPD1) or 





















                                                 
7 One reason that agents in poor countries acquire less schooling than agents in rich countries may well be 
related to the fact that agents may be facing a borrowing constraint that puts a limit to the amount they 
can borrow against future earnings and that this constraint is more severe in poor countries. 
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| 7 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
n Lucas’ (1988) model, aggregate production depends not only on the aggregate 
capital stock and the effective workforce but also on an external effect measured by 
the average level of human capital. In our model we assume that much of the 
external effect hypothesized by Lucas is captured by a social infrastructure that promotes 
the acquisition of skills and protects these skills in the workplace. To test this 
hypothesis, we propose to measure the quality of this social infrastructure using the 
economic security index, ESI, compiled by the ILO. Our results lead us to conclude 
that once economic security is controlled for, educational attainment plays no role in 
explaining differences in output per worker across countries: economic security is seen 
to be a good proxy for human capital whilst educational attainment is not. This suggests 
that a useful way to model human capital is to let ESI interact with educational 
attainment. We also put forth the hypothesis that there is a mechanism of learning-by-
doing at work. Our empirical results suggest that countries with high economic security 
are better placed to use efficiently the skills accumulated through formal education and 
are better placed in exploiting profitable opportunities to expand physical capital than 
countries with low economic security. To put it differently, countries with high ESI are 
better placed to exploit the mechanism of learning-by-doing than countries with low 
ESI. 
 
The fact that labor can move freely from firm to firm makes it rather costly for each 
firm acting in isolation to provide the right environment for maintaining and improving 
skills. Clearly, there is considerable scope for government intervention to take advantage 
of the externality afforded by human capital and to provide incentives to firms to offer 
opportunities for training on the job and/or other schemes that enhance skills. Not 
surprisingly, what is also important empirically is for firms to enjoy a low rental price 
for their capital. What recommends these conclusions is the fact that the hypotheses 
advanced in this paper are supported rather well by the empirical evidence. We have 
been able to explain, to a large extent, the reasons for cross-country differences in 
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APPENDIX. OBTAINING IN-SAMPLE PREDICTIONS  
 
Since the empirical specifications are (essentially) log-linear in the variables, to obtain 
“predictions” about the average level of the dependent variable we need to calculate the 
antilogarithm of the average “predicted” level for the logarithm of each of the 
dependent variables in the sample. However problems arise when there are outliers in 
the dependent variables. To illustrate a procedure that can mitigate the problem in the 
presence of outliers, consider a simple estimated log-linear relationship without a 
constant:  iii exy += lnln α  
where ie  is the estimated residual associated with the i
th cross-section, and where by 
assumption, there are one or more outliers in the ixln  in the sample(s) of interest. 
Suppose, next, that the samples of interest are the group of the five richest and the five 
poorest countries. To assess the explanatory power of x in “predicting” the average level 
of y in, say, the five poorest countries, we assembled the ( )ii xx ,ln  of the poorest five 















⎛ + ∑∑ and pxe lnα . To assess the 
explanatory power of x in “predicting” the average level of y in, say, the five richest 
countries, we proceeded in a fashion similar to that used to compute the average level of 
y in the five poorest countries. That means first obtaining rxln and then proceeding to 
obtain rxe lnα . Accordingly, the “predicted” ratio of the average y in the five richest 
countries relative to the average y in the five poorest is ( )pr xxe lnln −α .  
 
For the sake of consistency and as a measure of precaution, we applied a similar 
procedure to calculate the average of the “observed” y. For instance, to calculate the 
average of the observed y for the five richest countries, we assembled the ( )ii yy ,ln  for 

















 and similarly py)( . Hence, the 
“observed” ratio of the average y in the five richest countries relative to the average y in 
the five poorest countries is given by pr
yye )()( − .  
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